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Classificatory Theory in Biology 
 
Abstract: Scientific classification has long been recognized as involving a specific style of 
reasoning and doing research, and as occasionally affecting the development of scientific 
theories. However, the role played by classificatory activities in generating theories has not been 
closely investigated within the philosophy of science. I argue that classificatory systems can 
themselves become a form of theory, which I call classificatory theory, when they come to 
formalize and express the scientific significance of the elements being classified. This is 
particularly evident in some of the classification practices used in contemporary experimental 
biology, such as bio-ontologies used to classify genomic data and typologies used to classify 
‘normal’ stages of development in developmental biology. In this paper, I explore some 
characteristics of classificatory theories and ways in which they differ from other types of 
scientific theories and other components of scientific epistemology, such as models and 
background assumptions. 
 
Keywords: theory; biology; classification; data; bio-ontologies. 
2 
 
1. Introduction: Classification as theory-making 
 
The epistemic role of classificatory practices, long regarded as a conceptually uninteresting part 
of scientific research, is currently being reconsidered. Albert Crombie (1994) and Ian Hacking 
(2002) have argued that scientific classification involves a specific style of reasoning which is 
central to scientific research. John Pickstone has also recognized natural history, and the 
classificatory practices therein, as a unique “way of knowing”: in his words, “knowing the 
variety of the world” by “collecting, describing and displaying” (Pickstone 2000: 60). Pickstone 
rightly emphasizes the broad historical and cultural context of classification in natural history, 
which include a variety of motives such as “pride of possession, intellectual satisfaction and 
commerce and industry” (ibid: 60); similar themes have been extensively discussed in 
sociological approaches to biology (e.g. Bowker and Star 1999). Here I wish instead to focus on 
the epistemic results of classification. Staffan Müller-Wille (2007, 2012 with Charmantier) and 
Bruno Strasser (2011, and 2011 with de Chadarevian) have provided extensive historical studies 
of the ways in which classificatory work ranging from 18
th
 century taxonomy to 20
th
 century 
molecular biology has involved both experimental and descriptive activities, collection as well as 
explanation, observation as well as analysis. Müller-Wille in particular has pointed to the role of 
classificatory practice in shaping ontological commitments and providing conceptual scaffolding 
to biological research. In a similar vein, Ursula Klein has examined the ways in which the 
diversity of classification systems populating 18th century chemistry was used by historical 
actors to highlight wide differences in ontological beliefs (Klein and Lefèvre 2007), and Lorraine 
Daston has written about taxonomic practice as ‘metaphysics in action’ (Daston 2004: 158). On 
the philosophy front, John Dupré has articulated the growing consensus around the peculiar 
epistemic role of classification by pointing out that “classification in biology has a life of its 
own” (Dupré 2001), and that classification systems such as taxonomies and phylogenies 
profoundly affect the ways in which organisms are conceptualized in biology (Dupré and 
O’Malley 2007). Here I intend to go further than these claims, by arguing that classificatory 
practices can sometimes become deeply theoretical activities -- not merely theory-laden, but 
theory-making; and that this way of theorizing is an important component of biological 
reasoning, to be distinguished from other elements of theory such as law-like generalizations 
(like Hardy-Weinberg’s law of population equilibrium), explanatory principles (such as selection 
in evolutionary theory), mechanisms (e.g. descriptions of how DNA replication takes place), or 
modeling activities (for instance, the use of graphs to illustrate metabolic networks – although 
admittedly, these would count as forms of theorizing only under a semantic account of theories). 
In this paper, I sketch some key characteristics of classificatory theories and focus on their role 
in experimental research - what it is that they do and do not enable scientists to do. 
 
For the purposes of my argument, I shall use a conception of theory-making as a fundamental 
practice in science, which is enmeshed and intertwined with other practices such as data 
collection, experimental intervention and modeling, but which can be analytically distinguished 
from them. The vision of scientific research that most closely resonates with this view is James 
Griesemer’s “house of science”, and particularly his view of scientific inquiry as a set of 
activities of exploration whose purpose is to understand natural phenomena through the 
production of data, models and theories (Griesemer 2000). I am particularly interested in 
Griesemer’s framing of data production and collection as tracking activities, whose material 
result is the generation of objects that can be treated as documents of the phenomena being 
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tracked (Griesemer 2006). This is a material conception of data consonant with Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger’s and Ian Hacking’s idea of data as “traces” and “marks” (Hacking 1992, 
Rheinberger 2011), which I analyzed in some detail elsewhere (Leonelli 2009).
1
 It is also a view 
that emphasizes the importance of scientists’ commitments, both practical (to instruments and 
materials) and theoretical (to specific conceptualizations and background knowledge), in 
conducting tracking activities and interpreting their products. 
 
What I want to consider here is the ways in which tracking activities generate theoretical 
commitments that sometimes become so formalized and influential as to deserve the status of 
‘theory’. My broad motivation is to explore the relation between tracking and theorizing 
activities in science, and the ways in which these activities inform each other. I view 
classificatory practices within experimental biology as an ideal locus for an analysis of the 
relation between scientific tracking and theorizing. All acts of classification, whether in or out of 
science, involve the grouping and labeling of objects in ways that are theoretically motivated as 
well as empirically informed by the tracking methods used to collect them. Within experimental 
biology, two characteristics lend classificatory activities additional epistemic power. On the one 
hand, classification aims at providing a representation of natural phenomena, and thus needs to 
conform to requirements for internal consistency, (relative) stability and empirical accuracy; on 
                                                 
1
 In my interpretation of this view, any material product of research activities, ranging from artefacts such as 
photographs to symbols (e,g, numbers), can be considered as a piece of data as long as (1) it is taken to represent an 
aspect of the phenomenon under investigation; and (2) it is possible to disseminate it across a community of 
scientists (the manipulation of artefacts aimed at their dissemination is also identified by Rheinberger, with a nod to 
Bruno Latour’s views on immutable mobiles, as crucial to transforming  ‘traces’ into ‘data’; Rheinberger 2011, 
344). Further, note that I am here treating all data, no matter whether in a digital or in a material form, as material 
artifacts. The reason for this is that digital artefacts are concrete objects, even if the physical constrains and the type 
of resistance offered by virtual environments are different from those encountered in non-virtual situations (data in a 
digital format are only visible and manipulable via interaction with computer screens). This position, which I expand 
upon in forthcoming work, is compatible with Wendy Parker’s idea of ‘computer experiments as, first and foremost, 
experiments on real material systems’ (2009: 488).  
the other hand, the criteria chosen for classification need to take account of its practical use in an 
experimental context, and particularly of how the suggested grouping of objects may inform and 
facilitate experimental intervention. The objects to be classified in this context comprise both 
phenomena of interest to scientists and the data produced to track them. Indeed, my analysis will 
build on the ambiguous relationship between data and phenomena, and on the importance of 
classificatory categories in interpreting data as evidence for claims about phenomena. 
 
To give flesh to these ideas, I shall first briefly describe two classification systems used to handle 
genomic data in model organism databases and morphological data in developmental biology. I 
will then argue that these classification systems should be recognized as a specific type of theory, 
classificatory theory, which differs from other forms of theory more typically encountered in the 
philosophy of science literature. In closing, I shall discuss the stakes of my argument, and 
particularly why it is important to consider some classificatory outcomes as theories rather than 
as other components of scientific inquiry (such as models, instruments or background 
knowledge). 
 
 
2. Classificatory activities in contemporary biology 
 
In this section, I briefly review two cases of classificatory activities in biology which exemplify 
my general argument on the theory-making power of classification. The first is the case of bio-
ontologies, classification systems primarily used to store, organize and retrieve data acquired 
from biological materials via digital databases accessible through the internet. The Gene 
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Ontology, one of the best developed bio-ontologies to date, was developed for use within 
community databases as a standard for the annotation of gene products deriving from research on 
model organisms (Ashburner 2000, Leonelli 2010, 2012a). A chief characteristic of bio-
ontologies such as the Gene Ontology is their use of biologists’ own research interests as a basis 
for classification. Bio-ontologies classify data through terms that refer to the phenomena for 
which those data are supposed to provide evidence (where by phenomena I mean the highly 
structured, experimentally situated labels given by researchers to their research objects, as 
described in Bogen and Woodward 1988
2
). In other words, the choice of classificatory categories 
is based on the existing research interests of experimenters and on available conditions for 
collecting and analyzing the data in question. At the same time, given the increasing need for 
wide dissemination of genomic data across research contexts, bio-ontologies are constructed to 
work across different model organism communities and separate disciplines. This means that the 
terms that they employ for classification have to be intelligible to as many biologists as possible, 
regardless of their specialist training or epistemic culture. To serve this purpose, bio-ontology 
terms, and their relation to each other, are defined very clearly and precisely, thus coming to 
constitute “formal representations of areas of knowledge” (Bard and Rhee 2004). For instance, 
the term “double-strand break repair via homologous recombination” is defined as “the error-free 
repair of a double-strand break in DNA in which the broken DNA molecule is repaired using 
homologous sequences. A strand in the broken DNA searches for a homologous region in an 
intact chromosome to serve as the template for DNA synthesis. The restoration of two intact 
                                                 
2
 Bogen and Woodward were famously ambiguous about their definition of phenomena, which can be taken to 
denote features of the world as well as the labels given to those features by researchers (e.g. McAllister 2007). For 
the purposes of my discussion, I am happy to maintain this ambiguity so that bio-ontologies can be interpreted as 
capturing real objects or the ways in which biologists describe those objects. The realism of bio-ontologies is hotly 
debated in applied ontology circles (e.g. Smiths and Ceusters 2010), and taking a position on this discussion is not 
relevant to my purposes here. 
DNA molecules results in the exchange, reciprocal or nonreciprocal, of genetic material between 
the intact DNA molecule and the broken DNA molecule” (Gene Ontology Website, accessed 
December 2011). 
 
Bio-ontology terms thus act both as standards and as regulatory ideas: they enable 
communication of and about genomic datasets by homogenizing a plurality of activities and 
meanings under one conceptual umbrella, which makes it possible to develop future research 
with a shared basis. When depicted in this way, bio-ontologies seem to behave like any other 
classification system, providing labels that conceptually structure and map a field of inquiry. One 
further characteristic of bio-ontologies, however, adds a spin to their epistemic status: the 
biological knowledge expressed through bio-ontologies is best understood when assessed with 
reference to the specific datasets being classified, as well as the means and materials used to 
acquire those data. Let me briefly elaborate on this important point. Bio-ontology terms are 
selected and defined with the purpose of facilitating the circulation and retrieval of existing 
bodies of evidence. In so doing, they provide a representation of the knowledge about biology 
that is usually assumed as background when circulating data: further, they formalize that 
knowledge so that it can be explicitly formulated as a set of claims about biological entities and 
processes, and used to assess and interpret the significance of specific datasets. Such a 
representation is not meant to be a complete, self-standing representation of what is known about 
those entities and processes. Rather, it is intended to capture the knowledge needed to use data 
already available on those entities and processes; and its significance is best interpreted in 
relation to the methods, materials and instruments used to track those entities and processes. This 
is why bio-ontology curators strive to include information about the provenance of data, usually 
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referred to as “meta-data”, in the databases that use bio-ontologies as classification systems. For 
instance, the Gene Ontology uses the term “double-strand break repair via homologous 
recombination” to capture data about Breast cancer type 1 susceptibility protein (BRCA1), and 
includes information about the type of experiment through which the data were generated, the 
paper where this was first described, and the group that made the annotation (in this case, the 
HUGO Gene Nomenclature Committee).  
 
The second case I wish to consider is what Alan Love describes as “typological thinking” in 
developmental biology and systematics, which in his words involves “representing and 
categorizing natural phenomena, including both grouping and distinguishing these phenomena 
according to different characteristics, as well as ignoring particular kinds of variation” (Love 
2009: 53). A good instance of this is the choice and use of specific descriptions and/or 
representations of normal stages of development as classification tools for data in developmental 
biology. Loves makes a strong argument, partly built in relation to other recent work on the 
importance of natural kinds as classification tools (Dupré 1993 and 2001, Brigandt 2009, Reydon 
2010), that the typologies used to classify stages of development are chosen partly on pragmatic 
grounds, such as familiarity with the types and formats of relevant data and the strategies through 
which those data are collected; and partly on the basis of expectations about which aspects of the 
organisms in question will be of most relevance to advancing existing scientific knowledge about 
developmental processes. For instance, developmental biologists select images or descriptions 
exemplifying stages in the post-embryonic development of chick or frog foetuses on the basis of 
their experience of what constitutes a “typical stage” across multitudes of different specimens 
(which in turn involves familiarity with the ways in which specimens are studied and the specific 
kinds of data acquired through those processes) and of their background expectations about how 
images of foetuses at different stages are collected and interpreted in their field (Minelli 2003). 
These are choices about tracking, i.e. about how to acquire material documents (data) enabling 
the investigation of biological processes of interest (in this case, the development of a given 
organism). These choices notoriously have descriptive as well as normative undertones: “[the 
classification of] normal stages involve assessments of ‘typicality’ because of enormous 
variation in the absolute chronology of different developmental processes” (Love 2009: 63; see 
also Griesemer 1996 for similar arguments). They embody specific assumptions about how to 
track and provide stable representations of an essentially dynamic and hugely species-specific 
process (e.g. what constitutes adequate data in the research programs in question), which result 
in knowledge about the very processes being investigated (e.g. statements identifying causal 
connections between developmental stages and homologies between different species) which is 
then used to evaluate and interpret available data.  
 
Classificatory categories such as developmental stages embody and formalize these choices and 
assumptions, and thus come to express substantive decisions about how development will be 
measured; which parameters count, and why; and which terminology and methods best 
encapsulate available knowledge on organismal development, while at the same time facilitating 
future efforts of data collection and interpretation. So, on the one hand, these classificatory 
systems work at least partly because of their efficiency as tools to co-ordinate the collection, 
dissemination and analysis of data on development; on the other hand, they constitute themselves 
conceptualizations of development which have consequences for how research in this area is 
carried out, and on what. In order to adequately assess the import and significance of such 
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conceptualizations, biologists typically evaluate the experimental context in which they were 
originally proposed. This provides a way to understand the pragmatic motivations for specific 
conceptualizations, and to assess their usefulness when applied in other experimental contexts. 
 
 
3. The features of classificatory theories 
 
Classification practices such as the ones depicted above co-ordinate and underlie the tracking of 
biological phenomena and the collection of the resulting data into representations that can be 
used to model those phenomena. In doing so, they offer a substantive formalization of biological 
knowledge about organisms, whose primary goal is to facilitate the interpretation and further 
collection of data about organismal structures and development across species. These 
formalizations uncover knowledge that is given for granted when collecting, disseminating and 
using data. Further, by assembling, integrating and expressing knowledge used to handle data, 
these classification systems make a new and unique contribution to scientific research: they 
express knowledge that cannot be found anywhere else (models, instruments, existing theories or 
textbooks). This is not necessarily the same as contributing entirely new knowledge, in the sense 
of capturing new discoveries: for instance, bio-ontologies tend to integrate and formalize 
knowledge that already exists, but is dispersed in different areas of biological research (such as 
different model organism communities, or different subdisciplines working on the same 
phenomenon). This formalization requires extensive conceptual work, and often constitutes an 
important step forward in the development of biological knowledge, even if it does not 
necessarily incorporate paradigm-shifting discoveries. For instance, the Gene Ontology has 
developed a new definition of the term ‘gametogenesis’ that takes account of the differences 
between this process in plants and animals, which researchers were able to articulate clearly 
thanks to this classificatory practice (for more details and examples, see Leonelli et al 2011).  
 
This example shows how classification systems such as the Gene Ontology are not the same as a 
simple list of items, where existing materials are ordered according to an explicit, pre-existent 
conceptual criterion (as in the case of biodiversity surveys for instance, where an inventory of 
biodiversity is constructed around a specific species criterion; or botany manuals, where 
observers of plants are invited to identify them according to pre-existing categories). The process 
of ordering alone does not amount to theorizing, and often in science things are ordered 
according to pre-established criteria, a process that does not generate significant conceptual 
implication. When ordering is intertwined with the analysis and interpretation of the scientific 
meaning of data, something more is at stake. The criteria for what count as good terms, 
definitions and links with data within the Gene Ontology, and thus for what biological 
knowledge is expressed in the system, are developed as part and parcel of the process of 
classification. As a result of this process, classification systems such as bio-ontologies and 
developmental stages are more than just theory-laden: they express criteria to evaluate and 
interpret the scientific significance of the items which they are used to classify. This is 
knowledge that underpins and directs scientific practice, the production of new data and, most 
importantly, debates about the structure and functioning of biological entities and processes. In 
this sense, classificatory systems such as bio-ontologies and stages of development constitute a 
form of theory, which I shall henceforth refer to as classificatory theory. Viewing these systems 
as theories recognizes their crucial epistemic role in expressing the biological knowledge 
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underlying experimental research, while at the same time emphasizing the fallible, dynamic and 
context-dependent nature of such knowledge.
3
 Like Quine’s webs of beliefs, classificatory 
theories face the “tribunal of experience”: they are regularly challenged by new evidence and can 
be modified and updated when necessary. Recognizing the role of bio-ontologies as theories 
uncovers and highlights the conceptual substance and commitments underlying their adoption, 
thus alerting biologists against an uncritical use of databases which use these classification 
systems. Similarly, the identification of types used in developmental biology as forms of theory 
enables their critical discussion and, where necessary, questioning in the face of contradictory 
conceptualizations or experimental results. As stated by three prominent developmental 
biologists discussing the status of developmental stage as tools for data analysis in vertebrates: 
“thinking in terms of types, either as developmental stages or as putative ancestors, can be 
helpful in searching for order in the diversity of animal life. However we need to be aware of the 
limitations of typologism” (Richardson et al. 1998).  
 
In short, I am not arguing here that all classification systems need to be viewed as sources for 
classificatory theories. What I am arguing is that classifications can play the role of theories 
depending on the extent to which they embody and express a specific way of interpreting the 
overall significance of a set of empirical results. 
 
 
4. How classificatory theories differ from other forms of theory 
                                                 
3
 The dynamism of these types of theories might be best captured with reference to John Dewey’s account of the 
process of inquiry, in which knowledge is continually constituted and recreated through the process of scientific 
investigation, and the very attempt to formalize knowledge into theories works as a map and as an enabling 
condition for such change (Dewey 1938). 
 I now turn to the status of classificatory theories vis-à-vis other forms of scientific theorizing, 
such as for instance law-like generalizations. I confront this issue by discussing how some of the 
main characteristics that are typically attributed to scientific theories apply to the case of 
classificatory theories. As I show, each of these characteristics fits the case of classificatory 
theories, and yet it is realized in ways that differ substantially from other notions of theory.  
 
(1) Generalizing 
Classificatory theories aim towards generality in the sense that they provide common labels 
covering a number of phenomena and related research results. These general labels are used to 
interpret the evidential value of new datasets, provide heuristic guidance and conceptual 
structure to future investigations and contribute to biologists’ understanding of phenomena. Their 
level of generality is, however, not fixed, and far from aspirations to universality: 
• It is not fixed because the scope of application of classificatory theories can vary greatly 
depending on the research context and objects on which they are used, as well as the 
scientist(s) using them (thus mirroring the notion of formalism proposed by Griesemer in 
this special issue). On the one hand, the significance and epistemic value of 
classificatory theories is domain-dependent: they can be accepted or challenged 
depending on the research context in which they are used. On the other hand, the 
meaning and intelligibility of these theories depends on their user’s knowledge of the 
scientific practices through which they were developed: that is, knowledge of the 
materials, settings and techniques through which their objects – the phenomena which 
they posit and characterize – have been tracked. In other words, the meaning and 
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epistemic value assigned to theoretical claims made as a result of classificatory practices 
depends on one's expertise in tracking the phenomena in question.
4
  
 
• And it is far from aspiration to universality, because classificatory theories tend to accrue 
generality over narrowly defined domains. For instance, both the Gene Ontology and 
stages of development aim to generalize over species, by making classificatory 
categories applicable beyond the species on which data were originally obtained. This 
aspiration manifests itself differently depending on which species are targeted. Different 
classifications of stages of development tend to cover species that are phylogenetically 
close, such as specific families of vertebrates. Within the Gene Ontology, generalizing 
over species has meant generalizing over the most popular model organisms on which 
molecular data are being gathered (so the principal aim is generalization over 
Arabidopsis thaliana, C. elegans, Drosophila melanogaster and Mus musculus – no 
small endeavour of course, given the diversity among these organisms
5
).  
 
(2) Unifying 
Margaret Morrison’s 2007 account of theoretical unification, which the diversity of scientific 
practices into account, proves very useful in clarifying the kind of unity that classificatory 
theories aim to foster. This is what Morrison calls reductive unity (as opposed to synthetic unity): 
                                                 
4
 Krakenau et al note that ‘One of the vaunted benefits of machine learning is that classification and prediction tasks 
can be performed without insights into the structure and dynamics of the underlying system’ (2011: 272). When 
considering bio-ontologies, one of the main motors of machine learning, as a form of theory, it is clear that this 
conceptualisation of machine learning does not hold. Classification is a highly conceptual exercise, whose value and 
significance can only be assessed through knowledge of the underlying biological system. 
5
 One could question the extent to which this generalisation has been successfully achieved. While I do not see this 
as crucial to my argument, which concerns the underlying aspiration of this system to generalise rather than its 
success in doing so, I have discussed the successes and difficulties of this enterprise in Leonelli et al 2011 and 
Leonelli 2012b. 
an ideal of unity which only aims to establish some kind of commonality between different 
phenomena, without necessarily embedding that commonality within an overarching conceptual 
structure. Indeed, systems such as bio-ontologies aim to achieve classificatory categories that 
highlight similarities between different species, and accordingly bio-ontology curators devote 
much of their time to standardising terminology in ways that fit different biological subcultures. 
This reductive unification is not coupled with the attempt to achieve synthetic unity. Rather, 
classificatory systems such as bio-ontologies or developmental stages aim to enable scientists to 
pursue disunified, fragmented research about a large variety of objects. Classification systems 
tend to achieve reductive unity by abstracting from specific instances of entities or processes to 
one, unique label pointing to common features; once this is achieved, classificatory theories try 
to preserve complexity and to capture biological diversity by using a vast number of terms to 
identify phenomena. These classifications do not aim to reduce the number of labels used –– this 
might happen as a result of the attempt to develop efficient tools for experimental research or, as 
we saw above, generalisations over species, but it is not a primary concern nor a necessary 
characteristic for these systems. The Gene Ontology for instance keeps diversifying and adding 
terms, rather than trying to reduce the terms it uses, so as to capture as precisely as possible 
existing knowledge about the specific processes or entities being investigated. 
 
(3) Explaining 
If we define explanations as descriptions employed to answer ‘how’ questions, following 
Michael Scriven (1969), then classificatory theories can definitely be seen as explanatory. For 
instance, the question ‘how does gametogenesis work?’ can be answered by quoting the 
definition of gametogenesis developed by the Gene Ontology; and one way to answer the 
16 
 
question ‘how does the chicken embryo develop bone structure’ is to list the developmental 
stages through which bone structure is developed. By contrast, classificatory theories can hardly 
be seen as explanatory if, by explanation, we require reference to general explanatory principles 
or to highly general, law-like statements, as required for instance by the deductive-nomological 
model of explanation. Classificatory theories do not involve law-like, axiomatic statements such 
as the mathematical equations used in population genetics (e.g. Hardy-Weinberg’s law of 
population equilibrium); they also differ from theories such as evolutionary theory, where a few 
basic principles provide the tenets for explaining the complex mechanisms of heredity. 
Strikingly, classificatory theories may display explanatory power, but do not set out to find 
explanations in the first place. Explanatory power is thus a secondary epistemic virtue in this 
kind of theorizing. . Other epistemic virtues take precedence in shaping this type of 
formalization: for instance, empirical accuracy, wide intelligibility, and heuristic value for future 
research. 
 
(4) Providing a grand vision guiding research 
Another characteristic often attributed to scientific theories is their role as providing grand ideas / 
general frameworks that can inspire and direct empirical investigations - as in the case of the 
central dogma in 1960s genetics, for instance.
6
 Again, classificatory theories do provide such a 
vision, but not in the ways that other types of theory do. Classificatory theories might commit to 
a specific vision of life, yet such a commitment is not central nor is it necessary to their 
development. Developing these theories might involve committing to other types of theories that 
provide all-embracing interpretations of reality, such as for instance evolutionary theory or, in 
the case of bio-ontologies, the principle of genetic conservation across species. However, such a 
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 For a discussion of the role of grand theories in data-intensive science, see Callebaut (2012). 
commitment is not necessary to their development, and classificatory theories rarely contribute 
to advancing such broad visions of the contents of biological knowledge. What classificatory 
theories do is embodying first and foremost a vision of how biological research should be 
conducted, rather than a vision of the content of biological knowledge itself. It is a heuristic role 
grounded primarily in methodological commitments, which may carry great epistemic and 
possibly ontological import depending on how (uncritically or critically) they are embraced by 
working scientists. Classificatory theory can express knowledge underlying specific research 
programs, thus helping to understand their assumptions and reflect on their implications. This 
does not require a grand vision for what biology should achieve and tell us about the world we 
live in. Rather, it provides a situated, localized expression of what (some) biologists believe 
about the world and how we go about studying it. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: What Is at Stake? 
 
A crucial objection that may be thrown against my arguments has to do with qualifying the 
results of (some) classificatory practices as a form of theory. What is at stake in the claim that 
classificatory practices constitute theorizing? Are classification systems not simply a component 
of scientific practice which affects, and yet does not constitute, theoretical knowledge? This 
objection seems especially strong in light of recent literature on the role played by elements other 
than theory, such as models, experiments and instruments, in shaping scientific research. Why 
are classifications of the type I described not a hitherto understudied type of model, or even 
background knowledge, rather than a form of theory? Would it not be enough to point to the 
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important role played by classificatory activities in providing conceptual scaffolding for 
biological knowledge (as implied, for instance, by Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007)? 
 
I believe that there are important reasons for pointing to classificatory activities as theory-
making, rather than simply as part of the background knowledge or modeling strategies used 
when theorizing. Probably the most important one is the role that such theory plays in delimiting 
the content and development of knowledge (what counts as biological insight, which form it can 
take); and as a target for critique and reference points for the construction of alternative accounts. 
Some classificatory systems systematically and synthetically express, rather than simply affect, 
knowledge obtained through scientific research, and they do it in a way that (1) is unique, since 
such knowledge is not formalized anywhere else in the same way; (2) has huge influence on 
knowledge-making practices; (3) enables experimenters to make sense of the results they obtain. 
At the same time, the conceptual framework that these theories provide only makes sense in light 
of specific traditions in handling data. The role played by what I call classificatory theories 
parallels Krakenau et al’s discussion of what they call “bottom-theory” emerging from data 
handling practices: “Theory provides the basis for the general synthesis of models, and a means 
of supporting model comparisons and ideally establishing model equivalence” (Krakenau et al 
2011: 272). Of course, classificatory theories are best understood in relation to the collection of 
models, instruments and commitments made by the researchers who produced it, as in the case of 
any scientific theory. However, they cannot be reduced to any of those other elements; and 
further, they provide a way to link and evaluate the epistemic results of using all those methods 
and tools to research nature. Articulating knowledge that enables scientists to assess and value 
their results is an achievement that goes well beyond listing a set of commonly used assumptions 
as a basis for further inquiry. In the latter case, existing knowledge is applied to put a given set of 
items into some order; in the former, existing knowledge is transformed and developed so as to 
facilitate the conceptual analysis of data. This is why the results of some classification systems 
should be viewed as theories rather than mere background knowledge - even if, as I have shown, 
this notion of theory differs from traditional depictions as a series of axioms or principles with 
great explanatory power and universal scope. 
 
This brings me, in closing, to briefly reflect on an underlying commitment I made throughout 
this paper: the commitment to a pluralistic account of scientific theorizing. I do not believe that 
philosophical debates on the notion of theory should be tied to a uniform definition of what 
theory consists of in the whole of science, and I thus do not see the recognition of variability 
among types of theories, each structured and used in order to serve specific research goals, as 
problematic. On the contrary, the identification of different types of theories seems to me to open 
the way for an increasingly sophisticated philosophy of science, which is at once responsive to 
scientific practices and attentive to their epistemic and ontological context and implications. This 
argument runs parallel to the more popular argument about the importance of pluralism in 
models (e.g. Wimsatt 2007, Morgan and Morrison 1999, Leonelli 2007), styles of reasoning 
(Hacking 2002, Winther 2012) and ways of knowing (Pickstone 2000). In fact, the recent 
insistence on the plurality and scope of different forms of modeling has threatened to discard the 
notion of theory altogether as a relevant component of scientific practice, particularly in the case 
of philosophers sympathetic to the semantic view of theories as families of models (Giere 1999) 
or models as autonomous agents (Suarez and Cartwright 2008). In contrast to these accounts, I 
am convinced that the notion of theory has still an important role to play in scientific 
20 
 
epistemology, and yet that our understanding of what counts as theory should shift to reflect the 
recent turn to scientific practice in analyzing other crucial components of science, such as 
models. 
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